In this paper, we found a strong positive post-rescue performance for acquiring firms.
Post-stock Performance of Bailout Acquisitions in Japan:
A One Decade Experience Abstract:
In this paper, we found a strong positive post-rescue performance for acquiring firms.
Furthermore, we observed even more dramatic recovery effects when we focused on accounting accrual components, such as the credit sale increases or reduction of PPE depreciation value.
We found that investors have been dubious with the solvency of the troubled firms at least one year before the announcement date of their acquisition. As a result, they sold the troubled firms' stocks heavily leading to sluggish sales that hover at a considerably low level during a one year period. However, once they are rescued by an acquiring firm, the target firm's business recovers dramatically.
Focusing on accounting accrual components (changes in ratio of receivables to total assets for one year preceding the rescue), we found a 35.92% average difference for three-year CARs between the highest and lowest ranked firms (reversed out into the acquiring firm's stock appreciation). We also found a 35.29% average difference for three year CARs between high vs. low firm ratio changes of depreciation costs against total assets for the year preceding the announcement.
Finally, we found the reversal effect on troubled firms who underwent a large stock sell-off, and found that a greater stock sell-off is strongly correlated to a more drastic reversal for the acquiring firm's stock appreciation after buyout. This paper focuses exclusively on rescue acquisitions from 1996 to 2004. We investigated the financial attributes of troubled firms that resulted in successful recoveries. First, we analyzed the representative components of accounting accruals used frequently by the troubled firm to boost their earning numbers in order to go unnoticed by investors who are trying to predict future economic trouble. Accounting accruals, which are at the company's discretion to some extent, help to determine the earning's bottom line, and will help us to predict future economic trouble with detailed knowledge about the accounting accruals. Second, we analyzed the financial attributes that can explain the company's dire economic situation and poor fiscal health. The financial metrics of the former include inventory accumulation and/or gross income loss combined with decreasing sales and/or net incomes. The financial metrics of the latter involve over-leverage and a lack of liquidity.
We hypothesize that there is a positive inverse effect between acquiring firms after the rescue of troubled firms, because we believe that investors have taken into account the possibility of bankruptcy and sold heavily stocks of insolvent firms in advance. We also hypothesize that the more depreciation of a troubled firm's stock prices, the more dramatic the post-rescue reversals for the acquiring firms.
In general, bailouts are caused by many reasons and defined in different ways, which makes it difficult to identify bailout cases precisely. Therefore, we used specific criteria in order to obtain our data sample. We defined rescue acquisitions according to the following four types of discounted acquisitions:
(a) A company filed bankruptcy or experienced negative earnings over consecutive quarters that built up to an overall negative capital.
(b) Large shareholders sold their shares to outside business interests at reduced prices.
(c) Private placement of a large amount of new shares at a discounted price in external business interests.
(d) Discounted tender offer bids.
(2) Composition
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The composition of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of previous research and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 is a general outline of our data sample and data characteristics. Section 4 delineates our methodologies for identifying the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquiring and target firms.
Section 5 presents the results of our investigation with consideration to our hypotheses, and the subsequent cross-sectional stock returns using univariate tests. Section 6 review our main conclusions and future research goals.
Developments of Our Hypotheses
There are two distinct types management behaviors when using discretionary accounting accruals. Beaver (2003) introduced them as following: First, is an "opportunistic" discretion behavior which results in an adverse selection or moral hazard for the management. The second typology is in regards to management "signaling" and naturally involves management motivation in the discretion of accounting accruals revealing parts of private information to investors. Dechow et al. (1996) found that firms who faced the risk of bankruptcy especially manipulated the reported earning numbers by using accounting accruals from the previous two fiscal years. This was uncovered after SEC allegations, and enforcement actions were taken by SEC in the U.S. Scott (2006) also introduced in his accounting theory text book that the components of accounting accruals play a great role in the manipulation schemes of firm managers. He identified the four components to be at the considerable discretion of the manager controlling the reported earnings number. First is the accounts receivables, second is the PPE depreciation, third are the inventories, and the fourth includes accounting payables.
Previous research focuses on the components of accounting accruals as follows: Callen et al. (2004) provided empirical findings that internet companies, which have experienced a string of past and future losses, are greatly motivated to overestimate revenues and accounting receivables. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) also provided empirical findings showing that firms, who issue equity, appear to prefer managing account earnings upward by accelerating revenue recognition. They also found that managing earnings by accelerating recognition of revenues and account receivables is preferred by the managers compared to the earning management which defers the recognition of expenses.
The literature review paper of Healy and Wahlen (1998) also introduces the PPE depreciation and increase of inventories as the greatest portion of accounting accruals components. For example, Petty and Williams (1994) , whose sample is comprised of preceding management buyout offer cases, provides evidence that PPE depreciation is the most easily manipulated component of accounting accruals.
Finally, the fundamentals textbook by Friedlob and Schleifer (2002) also introduces the account receivables and inventories as the most controllable components.
For example, a company may increase sale revenues by lowering their credit requirement standards and granting credit to less creditworthy customers. The firm's inventory can grow and expensed by delaying the transfer of inventory costs from the account to the cost of goods sold. Therefore, we can hypothesize that detailed knowledge about accounting accruals can help to predict future economic troubles causing a positive inverse effect between the subsequent stock performance of acquiring firms and the magnitude of accounting accruals in saved troubled firms. Highly sophisticated investors have noticed the opportunistic behavior of accounting accruals within troubled firm managements, and have incorporated the risk of bankruptcy in the troubled firm's stock price. Therefore, once the troubled firm is rescued by an acquiring firm, the bankruptcy risk lapse will already be reflected within the acquiring subsequent stock price as a counteracting effect. Henceforth, we can propose the following hypothesis:
H1: There will be a positive inverse effect between the subsequent stock performance of acquiring firms and the magnitude of accounting accruals for saved firms. The greater the magnitude of accounting accruals and/or accounting accruals components of the troubled firm, the greater the subsequent stock performance of the acquiring firms. Shumway (2001) found that investors actually notice a firm's bankruptcy risk (in this context, accounting accruals are one of the indicators for bankruptcy risk), and the firm's preceding negative stock performance has a significant power to predict a firm's risk of bankruptcy. Therefore, we can propose the following hypothesis:
H2: There will be a positive inverse effect between the subsequent stock performance of acquiring firms and the magnitude of selling-off of the flailing firm's stocks immediately preceding the acquisition. The greater the magnitude 9 of the close-out stock sale for the troubled firm, the better the subsequent stock performance of the acquiring firm.
We also analyze the financial attributes that can help explain the company's dire economic situation and poor fiscal health. The financial metrics of the former include a consecutive decrease in sales and/or the EBIT number. The financial metrics of the latter involve over-leveraging and a lack of liquidity.
If the troubled firm is only saved because of its poor fiscal health rather than ineffective business practices, then the business will recover dramatically after the bail-out rescue that naturally settles financial issues externally. Henceforth, we can hypothesize the following: H3: The greater the magnitude of the rescued firm's health condition represented through poor liquidity and/or high leverage, the greater the subsequent stock performance of the acquiring firms, if the rescued firms sales and/or EBIT numbers are still going well.
Lastly, we developed a hypothesis with consideration to the synergy effect in M&As. Megginson et al.(2000) provided empirical evidence, using a sample of non-diversified firms from [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] , that firms in the U.S. have succeeded in merger activities. Non-diversification M&A one year CARs were on average 2.30%, however, diversified M&A one year CARs was on average -10.20%. Therefore, we hypothesize that companies in dire economic situations can only recover when they are bailed out by a company within the same industry or has similar business interests. We reasoned that if the acquiring company is in the same line of business, it is capable of making and easier, better judgment about the business potential and merits of a troubled company through their investments. We continue to hypothesize that a fiscally troubled company is more likely to recover after a bailout, because its business operations were efficient and not likely the source of bankruptcy. Hence, we can propose the following: H4: If a rescued firms sector is in the same line of business, the subsequent stock performance of the acquiring firm is generally higher compared to the diversified rescue of M&A.
Data and Sample (1) Data and sample
We identified troubled firms according to the following four types: filed bankruptcy (4 firms), large shareholders resale stocks at reduced prices (4 firms), private issuance of a large amount of stock at a discounted price (7 firms), and discounted tender offer bids (82 firms), respectively. Our sample period is from January (f) Finally, if firms announced a bailout and/or negative premium involving several independent firms on the same day, they are regarded as one transaction when we analyzed the long-term performance of the acquiring firms.
(2) Sample characteristics Table 1 shows the sample characteristics for four types of companies at risk according to year (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , mature markets, emerging markets, non-diversified, and diversified categories, respectively. We also show the bankruptcy firm characteristics separately. At-risk companies experience, in general, included low profitability, fiscal hardship, and deflated stock prices. The mean values of ROA, debt to equity ratio, cash ratio, and current ratio of mature markets (emerging markets) are 1.9892% (0.9510%), 7.4049 (3.6555), 9.1631% (10.6630%), and 129.75% (190.48%), respectively. On the other hand, these numbers of all listed firms are 4.8430%, 5.3639, 13.0425%, and 200.51%, respectively. The mean values of the previous three-year CARs for troubled firms is -15.9242% (-19.9819% ).
We also specifically show sample characteristics of the bankruptcy four firms, separately in the next to the most right column of Panel A in Table 1 . Figures for bankruptcy firms were much more severe than for troubled firms. Mean values of ROA, debt to equity ratio, cash ratio, and current ratio are -1.8143%, 5.6628, 4.4907%, and 48.65%, respectively. Mean value of previous three-year CAR for bankruptcy firms was tremendously low level of -107.0965%.
Methodology
In order to measure the long-term stock performance of acquiring firms, we identified a standard for comparison: the reference portfolio. The difference between the acquiring firm's stock performance and the reference portfolio is considered an abnormal return. The reference portfolio is based on risk factors shared with our stock samples. The two major risk factors utilized in this study are the book-to-market ratio and firm size. The procedures employed in the construction of the reference portfolio are as follows:
First, we identified all stocks listed during the same month that each bailout occurred. We divided these stocks into five groups according to firm size to define the cut-off points of each quintile.
Within each quintile, we further sorted the stocks into five groups using the book-to-market ratios as the limits. The individual stocks were ultimately sorted into one of twenty-five cells arranged in a five by five table.
In order to compare the long-term stock performance of acquiring firms to their reference portfolios, we first identified the appropriate cell for each acquiring firm with respect to size and the book-to-market ratio. Once the proper cell is identified, we calculated the average raw return of the stocks in that cell (excluding the sample firm).
The abnormal return for each acquiring firm was then calculated by taking the difference of the acquiring firm's stock return from the average raw return of stocks in its corresponding cell (reference portfolio). Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) indicated that cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) may cause misspecification when compared against the market performance. This problem implies that the null hypothesis where the abnormal return equals zero is rejected more frequently than just by chance alone. In Japan, previous research also indicates that abnormal returns (AR), with the TOPIX as a benchmark, often has a similar bias. Therefore, we calculated AR against the reference portfolio return marker.
Results
In Table 2 , we report one, two, and three-year acquiring firm CARs against the reference portfolio for the rescue M&A cases. We were able to find a statistically positive effect from the M&A rescue, which is consistent with our prediction of a positive recovery effect. We found excess returns of 6.98%, 14.14%, and 26.38% (10%, 1%, and 1% significant levels) in one, two, and three-year periods, respectively, for acquiring firms. Consistent with our predictions, this implies that investors have taken into account the possibility of bankruptcy, and sold the troubled firm's stocks heavily in advance. Therefore, stock prices which had depreciated with the troubled firm's hardships experience a recovery period after the acquiring firm's financial rescue.
(1) Accounting accruals
We analyzed four distinct accounting accruals components as well as the total accruals: (a) the increase in the ratio of receivables against total assets, (b) the decreased ratio of depreciation costs against the total assets, (c) the increase in the inventories against total assets ratio, and (d) the decreased ratio of accounting payables against total assets, which are generally believed that to be predictive of future economic distress. The total accruals are calculated following Dechow et al. (1995) and Sloan (1996) :
where ΔCA = change in current assets ΔCash = change in cash / cash equivalents ΔCL = change in current liabilities ΔSTD = change in debt included in current liabilities ΔTP = change in income taxes payable Dep = depreciation expense Table 3 shows the magnitude of the accounting accruals components compared to the total accruals according to the preceding fiscal year prior to the rescue M&A. The depreciation has the greatest magnitude, at 235.94%, compared to the total accruals, and the account receivables have the second largest magnitude at 149.83%. Meanwhile, inventories have a slight magnitude, with an average of -5.28%. This implies that rescued firms try to boost their earning numbers especially through the accounting components of the depreciation and accounts receivable, which is introduced in detail in Friedlob and Schleifer's (2002) fundamentals textbook.
The post-acquisition results for the acquiring firm performance according to the accruals components and total accruals are shown in Panel A in Table 4 . Panel A in Table 4 shows the difference between the high accruals components group (High accruals) and the low accruals components group (Low accruals), in addition to the difference between the high total accruals group (High accruals) and the low total accruals group (Low accruals). All of our samples are divided into three groups in accordance to their accounting accruals components and total accruals.
We found a significant difference amongst CARs between the low and high ranked firms with accruals components, especially for the depreciation and the account receivable characteristics, in line with the magnitude of the accruals components to the total accruals shown in Table 3 . We also found that the one, two, and three-year CARs, 17.66%, 20.96%, and 42.71%, of firms in the greatest increase in the accounting receivables group for the year preceding the rescue are higher than the CARs, -4.20%, 2.08%, and 6.79%, of firms in lowest increase in the accounting receivables group, respectively (1%, 10%, and 10% significant level, one-tailed z-statistics). We cannot find any significant differences in CARs for inventories and account payables, except for one year acquiring firms who have a 16.98% difference between high and low accrual groups. Meanwhile, with regards to the total accruals, we only find a significant difference in two year CARs, although we find the opposite differential sign (not significant) for three year CARs.
In Figure 1 , we show the acquirer's three year post-rescue performance for the three following groups: 1) the troubled firms whose preceding year's increase in account receivables are greatest, 2) the troubled firms whose preceding year's increase in account receivables are a medium amount, and 3) the troubled firms whose preceding year's increase in account receivables are least of all.
In Figure 2 , we show the acquirer's three year post-rescue performance for the three following groups: 1) the troubled firms whose preceding year's decrease of depreciation are greatest, 2) the troubled firms whose preceding year's decrease of depreciation are a medium amount, and 3) the troubled firms whose preceding year's decrease of depreciation are least of all.
In Figure 3 , we show target firms with a previous-rescue of high, middle, and low ranked performance of ratio increases for receivables against total assets one year prior to the rescue, respectively. In Figure 4 , we also show target firms with a previous-rescue of high, middle, and low ranked performance ratios of decreasing depreciation costs against total assets for one year preceding the rescue, respectively.
(2) Reversal effect of the acquiring firms post close-out stock sale of rescued firms
Panel B in Table 4 show the reversal effect of the acquiring firms after the close-out stock sale of rescued firms in detail. The more stock prices of troubled firms that had depreciated, the more dramatic the post-rescue reversals for the acquiring firms are. We divide acquiring firms into three groups in accordance with the preceding target one to three-year CARs.
The one, two, and three-year acquiring firms that rescued firms whose stock are most aggressively sold off in the previous year have higher CARs, 13.78%, 28.13%, and 45.57%, compared to acquiring firms that rescued firms whose stock were least sold in the previous year resulting in lower CARs, -4.60%, 0.65%, and 10.91%, respectively (5% significant levels of z-statistics, one-tailed).
In Figure 5 , we show the acquirer's three year post-rescue performance for the three following groups: 1) the troubled firms whose stocks are most aggressively sold off, 2) the troubled firms who has a medium amount of stocks sold, and 3) the troubled firms whose stocks were sold least of all.
(3) Fiscally Troubled
We hypothesize that a fiscally troubled company is more likely to recover after a bailout, because we assume that its business practices worked well and were not the source of bankruptcy. We constructed nine partition cells with breakpoints based on the tertile points of all listed firms. The upper section of Panel B in Table 5 is based on a three-year average sales growth, or EBIT growth, and the current ratio of rescued firms.
The bottom section of Panel B in Table 5 is based on a three-year average sales growth, or EBIT growth and the debt-to-equity ratio of rescued firms. Panel A in Table 5 shows the average values of sales growth, EBIT growth, the current ratio, and the debt-to-equity ratio, for the bottom, middle, and upper tertiles.
Panel B in Table 5 shows the results of the two-way ANOVA analysis. We find a statistically significant difference for the nine sales growth and debt-to-equity ratio partition cells over one, two, and three year acquiring firm CARs. In regards to acquiring firm two year CARs, the performance at 42.461% for the highest sales growth and highest debt to equity ratio is greater than the performance at 7.060% for the lowest sales growth and lowest debt to equity ratio. We also find a statistically significant difference for the nine EBIT growth and debt-to-equity ratio partition cells over two and three-year acquiring firm CARs. In regards to acquiring firm two year CARs, the performance at 46.849% for the highest EBIT growth and highest debt to equity ratio is greater than the performance at -10.096% for the lowest EBIT growth and lowest debt to equity ratio.
However, we could not find any significant signs for the current ratio, except for two year CARs for acquiring firms. The performance rating, 43.062%, for the highest EBIT growth and current ratio is significantly greater than the performance rating, -14.451%, for firms with the lowest EBIT growth and current ratio. Especially in M&A rescue cases, the heavy debt places a great burden on rescued firms, but once this fiscal barrier is removed business should recover dramatically.
(4) The profitability of vertical integration
We hypothesize that companies in troublesome situations can recover remarkably when bailed out by a company in the same industry or with similar business interests. Table 6 provides the post-rescue CARs of all acquiring firms who rescued, respectively targets in both the same industry and diversified industries. However, we cannot find any significant differences between vertically integrated bailouts and diversified or horizontally integrated bailouts. Our results imply that acquiring firms observe their targets thoroughly, and are able to obtain in-depth information about them even when they acquired businesses in less familiar industries.
Concluding remarks
In our paper, we found a strong positive post-rescue performance for acquiring firms. Furthermore, we observed even more dramatic recovery effects when we focused on accounting accruals components, such as the credit sale increases or reduction of PPE depreciation value. We found that investors have been dubious with the solvency of the troubled firms at least one year before the announcement date of their acquisition.
As a result, they sold the troubled firms' stocks heavily leading to sluggish sales that hover at a considerably low level during a one year period. However, once they are rescued by an acquiring firm, the target firm's business recovers dramatically. Focusing on accruals components (changes in ratio of receivables to total assets for one year preceding the rescue), we found a 35.92% average difference for three-year CARs between the highest and lowest ranked firms (reversed out into the acquiring firm's stock appreciation). We also found a 35.29% average difference for three year CARs between high vs. low firm ratio changes of depreciation costs against total assets for the year preceding the announcement. Finally, we found the reversal effect on troubled firms who underwent a large stock sell-off, and found that a greater stock sell-off is strongly correlated to a more drastic reversal for the acquiring firm's stock appreciation after buyout.
The implications of our findings are distinct and straight forward. Panel A in Table 1 shows the sample characteristics for four types of companies at risk according to year (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , mature markets, emerging markets, non-diversified, and diversified categories, respectively. Table 2 reports one, two, and three-year acquiring firm CARs against the reference portfolio for the rescue M&A cases. We were able to find a statistically positive effect from the M&A rescue, which is consistent with our prediction of a positive recovery effect. Table 3 shows the magnitude of the accounting accruals components compared to the total accruals according to the preceding fiscal year prior to the rescue M&A. Table 4 The post-acquisition acquiring firm performance results in terms of total accruals, accruals components, and the rescued firm's stock sale magnitude Table 4 shows the difference between the high accrual components group (High accruals) and the low accrual components group (Low accruals), in addition to the difference between the high total accruals group (High accruals) and the low total accruals group (Low accruals). All of our samples are divided into three groups in accordance to their accounting accruals components and total accruals. Statistical significance is tested by using both t-test and Mann-Whitney's rank-sum test. ***, **, * denote that the difference in mean values is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. ₈ denotes that p-value is two-tailed. Table 4 show the reversal effect of the acquiring firms after the close-out stock sale of rescued firms in detail. All of our samples are divided into three groups in accordance to their preceding CARs. Statistical significance is tested by using both t-test and Mann-Whitney's rank-sum test. ***, **, * denote that the difference in mean values is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. ₈ denotes that p-value is two-tailed. Panel A in Table 5 shows the average values of sales growth, EBIT, the current ratio, and the debt-to-equity ratio, for the bottom, middle, and upper tertiles. Panel B in Table 5 shows the results of the two-way ANOVA analysis. We constructed nine partition cells with breakpoints based on the tertile points in all listed firms: the upper section of Panel B in Table 5 is based on a three-year average sales growth, or EBIT growth and the current ratio of rescued firms. The bottom section of Panel B in Table 5 is based on a three-year average sales growth, or EBIT growth and the debt-to-equity ratio of rescued firms.***, **, * denote that the difference in mean values is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Table 6 provides the post-rescue CARs of all acquiring firms who rescued, respectively ,targets in both the same industry and diversified industries. Figure 1 shows the acquirer's three year post-rescue performance for the three following groups: 1) the troubled firms whose preceding year's increase in account receivables are greatest, 2) the troubled firms whose preceding year's increase in account receivables are a medium amount, and 3) the troubled firms whose preceding year's increase in account receivables are least of all. Figure 2 shows the acquirer's three year post-rescue performance for the three following groups: 1) the troubled firms whose preceding year's decrease of depreciation are greatest, 2) the troubled firms whose preceding year's decrease of depreciation are a medium amount, and 3) the troubled firms whose preceding year's decrease of depreciation are least of all. High ranked performance of ratio increases for accounting receivables against total assets one year prior to the rescue Middle ranked performance of ratio increases for accounting receivables against total assets one year prior to the rescue Low ranked performance of ratio increases for accounting receivables against total assets one year prior to the rescue High ranked performance of ratio decreases for depreciations against total assets one year prior to the rescue Middle ranked performance of ratio decreases for depreciations against total assets one year prior to the rescue Low ranked performance of ratio decreases for depreciations against total assets one year prior to the rescue Figure 3 shows target firms with a previous-rescue of high, middle, and low ranked performance of ratio increases for receivables against total assets one year prior to the rescue, respectively. Figure 4 shows target firms with a previous-rescue of high, middle, and low ranked performance ratios of decreasing depreciation costs against total assets for one year preceding the rescue, respectively. Stocks were sold least Figure 5 shows the acquirer's three year post-rescue performance for the three following groups: 1) the troubled firms whose stocks were most aggressively sold off, 2) the troubled firms who has a medium amount of stocks sold, and 3) the troubled firms whose stocks were sold least of all.
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